



Criminal Law at the Limit: Countering False Claims in
Elections and Referendums
Jeremy Horder∗
When should the criminal law intervene to deter and punish the promulgation of falsehoods
that are intended to influence political – electoral or referendum - campaigns? I will scruti-
nise the protection that UK criminal law provides for the interests of candidates, referendum
campaigners and voters, from the (potential) effects of damaging falsehoods. I suggest that nei-
ther the protection of candidates’ or campaigners’ reputations, nor the promotion of the public
good of collective decision-making by voters based on accurate and adequate information, in
themselves provide sufficient reasons for criminal law intervention. Falsehoods must normally
be intended to threaten, undermine or prevent effective participation in the political process
before the intervention of the criminal law is justified.
INTRODUCTION
On 29 May 2019, a private prosecution for misconduct in public office was
launched against Boris Johnson MP, by Marcus Ball and his crowdfunded com-
pany Brexit Justice Ltd.1 The allegation at the heart of the prosecutor’s case was
that, whilst holding the public offices of Mayor of London (until 9 May 2016)
and MP for Uxbridge and South Ruislip, Johnson had misconducted himself
by repeatedly endorsing a (supposed) lie central to the case for the ‘leave’ cam-
paign he supported, in the run-up to the referendum held in 2016 on the UK’s
continued membership of the EU. The supposed lie took the form of an al-
legedly false claim made by ‘Vote Leave’, an organisation promoting the case
for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.2 Vote Leave had claimed that leaving the
EU would see an end to the practice of ‘sending’ £350m per week to the EU,
a claim given prominence by being printed on the side of the ‘leave’ campaign
bus.3
∗London School of Economics. I am very grateful to John Child, and to the anonymous referees, for
helpful criticism and suggestions for improvement.
1 Ball’s organisation is now more broadly aimed at the criminalisation of lying in politics:
https://www.stoplyinginpolitics.org/ (all URLs were last visited 13 January 2021).
2 www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/.
3 For the claims and counter-claims involved in relation to the supposed lie (not further
analysed here), see for example the exchange of letters between Johnson and Sir David
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Criminal Law at the Limit
Initially,Ball’s application for a summons against Boris Johnson was accepted
by District Judge Coleman, but the issuing of the summons was judicially re-
viewed and quashed by the High Court on 3 July 2019.4 It is possible to base
prosecutions for misconduct in public office on allegations that an official has
lied.5 However, this prosecution was doomed to failure. Even if Vote Leave’s
claims were false or misleading, Johnson’s endorsement of them clearly did not
come in his capacity as a public official,as an aspect of his functions in discharging
the office of Mayor of London,or as an MP.6 So, in that sense, it was not possible
to show that he was guilty of misconduct ‘in’ public office.7 In any event, the
breadth and vagueness of the misconduct offence makes it a blunt instrument
with which to try to deter wrongful political speech, even when such speech
can be shown to involve statements known to be false or misleading.8 Even
if one puts such substantive legal points on one side, there are risks attending
private prosecutions in relation to such a controversial matter. There may have
been no professional investigation of the facts, no consideration of alternative
remedies or charges, and no proper regard paid to the accused’s right to free
political speech.9
Nonetheless, the prosecution raises an important question about the role that
criminal law should play in relation to false campaign statements, in both ref-
erendum and election campaigns. In what follows, I will be considering cases
in which the courts currently can be called on to adjudicate on false claims
made in political campaigns. I will argue that, even if some other legal rem-
edy for a false claim (such as overturning an election) may in some instances
be appropriate, criminalisation cannot be justified other than in restricted cir-
cumstances. Criminal liability is clearly justified only when a relatively distinct
range or kind of individual voting freedoms is threatened by the false claim,
although it may also be justified when such a claim is intended to undermine
the integrity of the election process as a whole. I will begin by considering an
overlooked offence of defrauding voters.
DEFRAUDING VOTERS AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Ball could have brought his prosecution against Johnson under section 115 of
the Representation of the People Act 1983 (the 1983 Act), a provision applied
to the 2016 EU referendum by section 32 of Schedule 1 of the European Ref-
erendum (Conduct) Regulations 2016. Under section 115, it is an offence to
4 Johnson v Ball [2019] EWHC 1709.
5 https://www.thelawpages.com/court-cases/Keith-Wallis-12790-1.law. In 2017-18, 14,771
people signed a petition to Parliament demanding that, ‘it should be made illegal, ‘for any UK
politician to lie or mislead the public’.
6 See the skeleton argument on behalf of Johnson: [2019] EWHC(QB) CO/2148.2019.
7 Law Commission,Reforming Misconduct in Public Office: Issues Paper 1 (2016) para 2.116-2.117.
8 ibid, ch 4.
9 C. de Than and J. Elvin, ‘Private Prosecution:A Useful Constitutional Safeguard or a Potentially
Dangerous Historical Anomaly?’ [2019] Crim LR 656, 668.
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exercise ‘undue influence’on a voter, including through the use of a ‘fraudulent
device or contrivance’.10 The offence is committed by D:
if, by abduction, duress or any fraudulent device or contrivance, he impedes or
prevents, or intends to impede or prevent, the free exercise of the franchise of an
elector [or voter] … or so compels, induces or prevails upon, or intends so to
compel, induce or prevail upon, an elector [or voter] … either to vote or to refrain
from voting.
Section 115 thus addresses two situations, where fraud is concerned: where D
uses or intends a fraudulent device or contrivance to impede or prevent, ‘the free
exercise of the franchise’, and where D uses – or intends to use – a fraudulent
device or contrivance to ‘induce or prevail upon’ a voter (not) to vote. The
supposed lie told by Vote Leave may not have been intended to, ‘impede or
prevent the free exercise of the franchise’;but did it,or was it intended to ‘induce
or prevail upon’ one or more voters to vote? It might seem obvious that it was,
in which case those knowingly involved in seeking to influence voters through
the supposed lie were guilty of the corrupt practice set out in the section 115
offence.However, the answer one gives to the question depends on the breadth
of understanding given to the notion of ‘freedom’ in voting, under section 115.
In its 2018 review of the fraud element in section 115, the Cabinet Office
suggested that:
This is intended to capture circumstances where a person ‘tricks’ a voter into voting
in a particular way and so prevents them exercising their vote freely. For instance, a
candidate could misrepresent themselves as standing for party A when in fact they
are standing for party B; so they may think that they have voted freely, but the
exercise of their vote has been impeded by the ‘trickery’.11
This analysis of section 115 fraud links the offence with the denial through
‘trickery’ of voters’ freedom in voting.12 The denial of freedom is in fact only
specifically mentioned in the first part of section 115, concerned with imped-
ing or preventing the ‘free exercise of the franchise’. As indicated above, the
second part of the offence is concerned with cases in which the fraud ‘induces
or prevails upon’ a voter (not) to vote. In the latter case, it is possible that a de-
frauded voter might still be acting freely in (not) voting. For example, if a fraud
10 In law, the acts prohibited by s 115 are called ‘corrupt practices’: see further, in the next section
below.The antiquated wording of s 115 comes from its ancestor, the Corrupt Practices Act 1854,
s 5. The wording, or something close to it, has been adopted in a number of countries around
the world: see for example Election Act 1996 (British Columbia), s 256; Election Offences Act
1954 (Malaysia), s 9;Massachusetts, General Laws, Part 1, Title VIII, ch 56, s 42.
11 Cabinet Office,Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information (London:Cabinet Of-
fice,2018) para 8.12.The example to which the Cabinet Office may be alluding here is Sanders v
Chichester [1994] EWHC 9 (QB), in which D garnered 10,000 votes by standing for the ‘Literal
Democrat’ party, in an election in which there was also a candidate for the Liberal Democrat
party. For discussion of this case, see Law Commission, Electoral Law: An Interim Report (2016)
para 11.33.
12 It is worth noting that ‘trickery’ ought generally not to be used as a synonym for fraud, because
trickery is wider in scope, extending beyond fraud. See further, Law Commission,Electoral Law:
A Joint Consultation Paper LCCP 218 / SLCDP 158 / NILC 20 (2014) para 11.50.
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played only a very minor role in their deliberations, we might still conclude
that their vote was ‘free’. Even so, the offence would still rightly be regarded
as having been committed in such a case, because the use of fraud to try to
persuade people (not) to vote is a significant wrong. Such conduct is certainly
a threat to people’s freedom in voting; but what form of freedom is in issue in
section 115 fraud?
The example of trickery used by the Cabinet Office – misrepresentation
about which party a candidate represents – suggests that what it has in mind is
a distinction between a more formal, procedural kind of freedom, and a sub-
stantive,merits-based kind. The procedural kind of freedom is concerned with
a variety of related issues such as the accuracy and comprehensibility of a ballot
paper, the maintenance of security and neutrality in the running of a polling
station, or with secrecy in casting a vote. If, to use the Cabinet Office example,
I am defrauded concerning who represents which political party on the ballot
paper, then the accuracy of the ballot paper – in terms of what it represents
– has, from my point of view, been compromised by the fraudster. That im-
pinges on a key procedural kind of freedom, the freedom I am meant to have
to distinguish between political parties when making my choice. This freedom
is predominantly formal and procedural: being able to get the ‘box ticking’ part
of the process right. By contrast, in interpreting the limits of section 115, one
might employ a more substantive, merits-based understanding of freedom in
voting and of what may threaten it. According to that more substantive under-
standing, voting should not be understood just as a box-ticking exercise, but
an act of political self-realisation: a manifestation of valuable autonomy.Whilst
such an act certainly pre-supposes the existence of the procedural conditions
for voting freedom just mentioned, it also entails the fulfilment of certain sub-
stantive conditions.13 In particular, the substantive, merits-based understanding
of voting freedom insists that the authenticity and autonomous value of voting
is diminished or undermined if the reasons the voter was persuaded to regard
as significant or decisive when ticking the box (‘How many 100s of millions
will the UK save by leaving the EU?’), turn out to have been false or entirely
misleading.14 With the latter sense of freedom in play, Vote Leave’s (supposed)
falsehood could indeed be viewed as having been intended to ‘induce or prevail
upon’ voters in a manner contrary to section 115. Such a view was at the heart
of the Johnson prosecution.
However, there are reasons for the courts to interpret section 115 narrowly,
as concerned almost exclusively (there might be rare exceptions) with frauds
intended to impinge on the procedural kind of freedom. For example, the
legitimacy of the role of the courts, and trust in the independence of the judi-
ciary, may be undermined if courts are required to adjudicate on the truth or
13 On the link between procedural and substantive rights, see L.Alexander, ‘Are Procedural Rights
Derivative Substantive Rights?’ (1998) 17 Law and Philosophy 19. The temptation to map the
distinction between form and substance on to a distinction between negative and positive free-
dom should, at this point, be resisted. I return to the importance of the latter distinction in the
section below headed ‘How to Protect Campaigners, and Candidates’.
14 J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 144, ‘One does not help people
to lead the lives they want to have by satisfying their false desires’.
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falsity of substantive political claims. The courts may not forensically, let alone
institutionally (in terms of the balance of powers), be well-placed to decide
whether a false claim threatened the integrity of voting as an autonomous ex-
pression of a point of view, frustrating people’s efforts to vote on the genuine
(de)merits of candidates or of referendum proposals.The delicate constitutional
balancing act involved was recognised when,putting criminal cases on one side,
general authority to adjudicate in cases of election fraud, corruption and intim-
idation was first transferred by the Election Petitions and Corrupt Practices at
Elections Act 1868 from a Committee of five MPs (who tended to vote on
partisan lines), to a judge of the superior courts. Benjamin Disraeli described
the move as involving a constitutional principle of ‘vast importance’.15 When
consulted about taking over such a responsibility from Parliament, in a letter of
6 February 1868 to the Lord Chancellor, Chief Justice Cockburn complained
that:
The decision of the Judge given under such circumstances will too often fail to
secure the respect which judicial decisions command on other occasions. Angry
and excited partisans will not be unlikely to question the motives which have led
to the judgment.Their sentiments may be echoed by the press.Such is the influence
of party conflict, that it is apt to inspire distrust and dislike of whatever interferes
with party objects and party triumphs.16
Similar points have been made in modern cases, strengthening the case for only
a restricted role for the courts in this field.17 I will now go on to consider other
ways in which the law (both statute and judge-made) shapes the criminal law’s
reach, in relation to false campaign statements.
THREE STATUTES APPLICABLE TO FALSE STATEMENTS
IN CAMPAIGNS
Under section 121 of the 1983 Act, a person entitled to vote in a gen-
eral election may present a petition to a specially convened Election Court
(presided over by two High Court Judges), claiming that another person – say, a
15 Benjamin Disraeli to Queen Victoria, 31 January 1868, in M.W. Pharand et al,Benjamin Disraeli
Letters:Volume Ten 1868 (Toronto,ON:University of Toronto Press,2014) 40.An ‘election court’
– considered further below – is now comprised of two High Court judges.The court established
to try parliamentary election petitions was constituted by two judges from 1879 onwards but
was not referred to as an ‘election court’ until 1883: Law Commission Research Paper, Legal
Challenge to Elections (London; TSO, 2012) para 1.10.
16 Cited by Thomas LCJ, in R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court [2010]
EWHC 3169 (Admin) at [23]. In a debate on the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal
Practices) Bill 1883, Patrick Martin, County Kilkenny MP for the Home Rule League, made a
similar point, arguing in favour of a narrow reading of s 115’s predecessor: ‘What one [judge]
considered permissible and fair, another held as an abuse and violation of the right of free speech
… The vagueness in the words would lead to unpleasant and injurious comments as to the
motives which influenced those election tribunals in their decisions’:HC Deb 15 June 1883 vol
280 col 702-703.
17 R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court ibid.
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successfully elected candidate – was guilty of a ‘corrupt’ or of an ‘illegal’ prac-
tice.18 A fraud contrary to section 115 is an example of a corrupt practice, but
the conduct I shall focus on here involves an illegal practice contrary to sec-
tion 106 of the 1983 Act. In broad terms (I consider the detail in the section
below headed ‘The Crime of Making False Statements about Election Candi-
dates’), section 106 creates the illegal practice of making a false statement, with
intent to affect a rival candidate’s electoral return, about the personal conduct
or character of the rival candidate. If the Election Court reports that this illegal
practice took place, then, amongst other things, under section 159 of the 1983
Act, the election of the successfully elected candidate is to be declared void.
Most importantly, the commission of this illegal practice, contrary to section
106, is also a criminal offence.
Section 106 is not applicable to referendum campaigns (a position criticised,
in due course), where there are no official individual ‘candidates’. Even so, two
other criminal laws may have an application in cases where falsehoods have
been promulgated (or other improper statements made), in either elections or
referendums. First, section 127(2) of the Communications Act 2003 applies in
relation to improper use of a public electronic communications network:
A person is guilty of an offence if he –
(1) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or
other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing char-
acter.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, incon-
venience or needless anxiety to another, he –
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that
he knows to be false, [or]
(b) causes such a message to be sent …19
There were 254 charges under section 127 in 2017.20 Secondly, alongside this
offence, should be set the more serious offence created by section 1(a)(iii) of
the Malicious Communications Act 1988.21 This makes it an offence to a send
a letter, electronic communication or article of any description which conveys
an indecent or grossly offensive message, which involves a threat, or which
conveys, ‘information which is false and known or believed to be false by the
18 Amongst other things, a corrupt practice may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to
two years (s 168), whereas an illegal practice is a summary offence punishable only by a fine (s
169).
19 The penalty upon summary conviction is a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both. See, further, Law
Commission for England and Wales, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping
Report Law Com No 381 (2018).
20 ibid, para 4.55.
21 See also the Public Order Act 1986, ss 4a and 5, as qualified by part IIIA, s 29J.
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sender’, in circumstances where one of D’s purposes in communicating in the
proscribed way was, ‘that it should … cause distress or anxiety to the recipient
or to any other person to whom he intends that its contents or nature should
be communicated’.22 There were 2626 charges under section 1(1)(a) in 2017,23
most of these being likely to have concerned ‘grossly offensive’,or, ‘threatening’
communications.Section 1 specifically mentions that causing distress or anxiety
need be only one of D’s purposes (it could be a subsidiary purpose).24 This
means the section may clearly apply when D’s main purpose in making the
proscribed communication is to influence voting in an election or referendum
(that will also be true of section 127(2) of the 2003 Act). In that regard, in what
follows, I shall be concerned with the 1988 and 2003 Acts only in so far as they
apply to false statements.
I will argue,first, that there is insufficient justification for making it a criminal
offence to engage in the illegal practice contrary to section 106 of the 1983
Act, as it stands. It is simply not enough that someone made a false statement
about the personal conduct or character of an election candidate, with intent
to affect an electoral return; although, as we will see, it perhaps ought to be a
different matter if someone makes such a statement intending to undermine the
integrity of the election as a whole. Secondly, I will argue that there needs to be
modification to the conditions under which the offences in the 1988 and 2003
Acts apply, in election and referendum campaigns, at least so far as falsehoods
are concerned.25 The application of those offences should be restricted to cases
in which the falsehood is (a) made in circumstances giving the candidate or
campaigner no adequate opportunity to counter the effect of the statement or
material, and (b) is intended to have so serious an effect on V’s mind as to be
liable to undermine their effective participation in the process.
POLITICAL SPEECH DILEMMAS AND CRIMINALISATION
Understandably, the proper limits to the protection of political speech in human
rights jurisprudence are contested.On the one hand, even in a highly political
election context, English courts have made it clear that ‘dishonest’ statements –
by which the courts have meant statements the content of which is not believed
to be true – may fall outside the protection for speech offered by Article 10
of the ECHR.26 On the other hand, the ECtHR has made it clear that when
22 See the discussion in Law Commission, n 19 above, ch 4. An offence may be met with a fine
and or a sentence of imprisonment for up to two years.
23 ibid, para 4.7.
24 That would be the position at common law, in any event, because liability does not in general
depend on whether it was D’s main or dominant intention to bring about harm or risk: R v
Hales [2005] EWCA Crim 1118.
25 I do not have space to address the issues raised by offensive, threatening or indecent statements
made in order to influence election campaigns. The Cabinet Office, n 11 above, has proposed
that the offences contrary to the 1988 and 2003 Acts should be made ‘election offences’, on
which see ‘How to Protect Campaigners, and Candidates’ below.
26 R (Woolas) v Parliamentary Election Court n 16 above;Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC
127 (HL), 238, discussed in J. Rowbottom, ‘Lies, Manipulation and Elections – Controlling
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controversial political words and speech can be made subject to criminal pros-
ecution, the existence of a background political context to the words or speech
makes it possible that the court will find that criminalisation is inconsistent
with Article 10, even if the words or speech involve insult, exaggeration, error,
or possibly even some element of known falsehood:
There is little scope under Article 10 for restrictions on freedom of expression
in the area of political speech or debate – where freedom of expression is of the
utmost importance – or in matters of public interest.While freedom of expression
is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative of the
people.27
Against this background uncertainty, a political falsehood dilemma concerning
the making of false statements may arise in a variety of circumstances. Legal
uncertainty over the applicability of criminal sanctions may itself, of course,
pose a dilemma for would-be publishers of information that may come to be
regarded as ‘fake news;’ but such a dilemma may also arise in other instances.
One example is when someone knows that if they make a political statement
that turns out to be false, their claim that they honestly believed in its veracity
when the statement was made is – perhaps because they are widely disliked or
distrusted – unlikely to be believed. Another instance of a political falsehood
dilemma arising is when at least some – and perhaps all – of what the speaker
intends to say is known by them to be untrue or misleading, but they nonethe-
less believe that there is sufficient reason to make the statement: in other words,
when they may not be acting ‘dishonestly’ in a broad sense of that term.28 An
example might involve the publication of falsely exaggerated figures for a par-
ticular MP’s parliamentary expenses, for the purpose of spurring the MP into
complying with a legal obligation to account for their actual expenses. In all
these instances, the existence of the political falsehood dilemma raises the worry
that would-be contributors to political debate may be wrongly deterred by the
prospect of sanctions from engaging in what is simply provocative, combative
or attention-grabbing political speech. If that happens, any criminal law cure
for lying in politics may turn out to be worse than the disease.
The political falsehood dilemma is part of a broader range of political
speech dilemmas posed by the criminal law for speakers making controversial
contributions to political debate.29 The criminal prohibitions, discussed in the
last section, on the distribution of grossly offensive, indecent or threatening
False Campaign Statements’ (2012) 32 OJLS 507, 519-520. Article 10 of the ECHR provides
that, ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers …’
27 Otegi Mondragon v Spain 15 March 2011 (Application no 2034/07) at [50]. For a First Amend-
ment discussion, see J. Weinstein, ‘Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American
Free Speech Doctrine (2001) 97 Virginia LR 491; Rowbottom, ibid, 521-522.
28 J. Gardner, ‘Wrongs and Faults’ in A.P. Simester (ed), Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: OUP,
2005) 51, 67-70.
29 See further, Rowbottom, n 26 above; C.Walker, ‘Reforming the Crime of Libel’ (2005-2006)
50 New York Law School Law Review 169, 180.
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statements or material are an example (not further considered here).30 So far as
false statements are concerned, as we saw in the last section, the 1988 and 2003
Acts restrict the prohibitions on making such statements to instances in which
the maker had the specific purpose of causing, ‘annoyance, inconvenience or
needless anxiety’ (2003 Act), or, ‘distress or anxiety’ (1988 Act).31 In certain
circumstances (considered in ‘How to Protect Campaigners, and Candidates’,
below), it may be legitimate to use the law to deter the making of statements
embodying a purpose or intent of one of these kinds, even in political campaign
contexts.However, neither the 1988 Act nor the 2003 Act addresses the partic-
ular problem of false statements made in political contexts. In that regard, the
Law Commission has rightly cast doubt on whether the purpose-based restric-
tions in the two Acts are consistent with a robust commitment to free speech
in political contexts:
Strictly speaking, [section 127(2)] could, for example, cover a politician or political
commentator who regularly posts social media messages in order to annoy others
– perhaps those with whom they disagree politically.The implications for the free-
dom of expression would be particularly acute if the offences were prosecuted and
enforced in this way.32
The debate in Parliament on the Bill that became the 1988 Act in fact made
it clear that MPs accepted that they should themselves be expected to toler-
ate a higher level of malicious communication than ordinary members of the
public.33 Further, the CPS guidance for prosecutors indicates that a prosecution
will not be necessary or proportionate if:
the communication was not intended for a wide audience, nor was that the obvi-
ous consequence of sending the communication; particularly where the intended
audience did not include the victim or target of the communication in question;
or the content of the communication did not obviously go beyond what could
conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society which up-
holds and respects freedom of expression.34
Whilst adherence to such restraining principles is admirable, the need for
such principles raises the question whether the criminal law has been exces-
sively shaped in this context by the authoritarian principle.35 The authoritarian
30 See J. Rowbottom, ‘Crime and Communication: Do Legal Controls Leave Enough Space for
Freedom of Expression?’ in D. Mangan and L. Gillies (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) ch 3.
31 I turn my attention to the prohibition on false statements in the 1983 Act, s 106 in the section
below headed ‘The Crime of Making False Statements about Election Candidates’.





Human Rights Act 1998, s 3 also, of course, imposes an obligation on courts to interpret such
legislation in way that is compatible with convention rights. I owe this point to an anonymous
referee.
35 See J. Horder,Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 9th ed, 2019) 86-93.
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principle stands for the view that broad and flexible offence definitions are
preferable to narrower, clearer ones, because it is better to provide prosecutors
and courts with the discretion to apply open-textured offences to new man-
ifestations of wrongs, than it is to tolerate gaps in the law’s protective scope
simply in order to provide citizens with greater clarity on the limits to their
obligations.Yet, in few contexts could it be more important to guard against an
authoritarian approach to criminal liability than in the case of political speech.36
Under the heading ‘How to Protect Campaigners, and Candidates’ below, I
will suggest some reforms to the scope of the offences under the 1988 and 2003
Acts that are aimed at creating a better balance between the protection of free
campaign speech, and the protection of election candidates (and leading refer-
endum campaigners). First, we should consider the alternatives to deterrence
through law.
THE ‘MORE SPEECH’ SOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS
What is sometimes referred to as a ‘more speech’ solution has generally been
regarded in democratic legal systems as preferable to legal (and a fortiori, criminal
law) intervention, as a counter-weight to lying in the public sphere. A ‘more
speech’ solution involves, for example, an information campaign – or publi-
cised ‘fact checking’ – to correct opinions or impressions formed on a false or
contentious basis.37 As Justice Brandeis famously put it inWhitney v California:
To courageous, self-reliant men [sic], with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government … [i]f there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.38
In so framing his argument, Justice Brandeis draws implicitly on an account
of republican political philosophy which places emphasis on the display by
concerned citizens of shared civic responsibility for maintaining the moral char-
acter of politics.
On the republican account, citizens feel obligated to defend the moral in-
tegrity of the polity through the display of what Habermas aptly calls ‘consti-
tutional patriotism,’ an inclusive political identity which can motivate citizens
to feel, ‘politically responsible for each other’.39 As Laborde and Maynor put it,
this is a:
36 P. Petit, ‘Criminalisation in Republican Theory’ in R. A. Duff et al (eds), Criminalisation: The
Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 132, 138.
37 See for example https://www.factcheck.org/; https://fullfact.org/.
38 Whitney v California (No 3) 74 U.S. 357 (1927), 377 per Brandeis J.
39 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 286, cited by C.
Laborde and J.Maynor (eds),Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008) 14.
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Tocquevillian patriotism where democratic citizens view their contribution to the
maintenance of the political community as being part of a common endeavor that
they share with others and one in which they have part ownership.40
For republican thinkers, the issue is not, or not solely, whether ‘more speech’
solutions negate or counter the harm of lying and dishonesty in politics more
effectively than legal restrictions or threats of punishment, although there is
certainly some evidence that reputational risk from having one’s falsehoods or
distortions exposed does deter politicians from engaging in such conduct.41 The
issue is whether, by relying too much on the one-way, top-down projection of
authority constituted by the law (with all its gaps, ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies in enforcement), to silence abhorrent or lying speech and speakers,we give
up on the very idea of a self-sustaining culture of uninhibited and vigorous but
respectful public debate.42
A ‘more speech’ solution is closely allied to what might be called a ‘better
speech’ ideal. Voluntary agreement on self-denying ordinances, in relation to
biased or inaccurate media presentation of politicians and their policies43 or in
relation to the conduct of an election campaign,44 may do more to enhance the
quality of public debate than the spectre of legal coercion.An important exam-
ple of the continued significance of the republican ‘more speech’ ideal is the rise
of a vibrant culture of the aforementioned practice of fact-checking, and what
might be called ‘falsehood shaming’.45 Since their emergence 20 years ago, fact-
checking organisations world-wide have increased in number by 90 per cent
since 2010, and now operate in more than 50 countries world-wide.46 Such
voluntary, ‘more speech’ initiatives have some crucial advantages over more for-
mal, legal means by which to deter lying and falsehood in politics – such as a
right of reply,or legal prohibitions on false statements.47 That is so, even though
there is evidence that so-called fact checking is regarded in some quarters as a
40 Laborde and Maynor (eds), ibid, 15.
41 B. Nyhan and J. Riefler, ‘The Effect of Fact-Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on US
State Legislators’ (2015) 59 American Journal of Political Science 529.
42 For discussion, see C.V. Ward, ‘The Limits of “Liberal Republicanism”: Why Group-Based
Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don’t Mix’ (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 581.
43 P. Wardle, The Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the UK’s Election Experience (London:
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2019) para 44: ‘The media in the UK generally takes
seriously its responsibility to cover politicians’ policies and opinions, and to provide an arena in
which candidates can debate, and/or exercise the right of reply to statements or media reports
that they consider to be inaccurate or offensive.’
44 See for example Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘Intimidation in Public Life’,
17th Report, CM 9543 (London, 2017) ch 5; https://democrats.org/who-we-are/what-we-
do/disinfo/campaign-and-state-parties/; Rowbottom, n 26 above, 531.
45 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-39779338;HL Select Committee on Democracy
and Digital Technologies,Digital Technology and the Resurrection of Trust Report of Session 2019-
2021 HL, Paper 77 (29 June 2020) paras 41-55.
46 L. Graves and F. Cherubini, ‘The Rise of Fact-Checking Sites in Europe’ 2016
at http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/publications/2016/rise-fact-checking-sites-europe/#fn-
5637-1; Commission Communication, ‘Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Ap-
proach’ COM(2018)236 final, 9.
47 Under the 1983 Act,s 106(3) makes it possible for an individual to obtain an injunction to restrain
the publication of defamatory (political) speech, and such measures have been used in political
campaign cases. See for example https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50565209.
© 2021 The Author.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 00(0) MLR 1–27 11
Criminal Law at the Limit
predominantly ‘liberal’ political enterprise, and hence not politically neutral.48
As a less formal practice, fact-checking can operate highly effectively without
having to confront the definitional problems characteristic of legal solutions,
solutions that remain highly sensitive to rule-of-law demands for certainty and
predictability. Even so, formal, top-down approaches are becoming popular. In
France, a law passed in 2018 (amending earlier legislation) made it possible for
the National Audio-visual Regulatory Authority to prevent, suspend or pro-
hibit TV or radio broadcasts controlled by a foreign state, if they are judged, ‘to
harm the fundamental interests of the nation … particularly by disseminating
false information’.49
A strategy of tackling political lying through the use of legal prohibitions faces
disadvantages, as compared with less formal ‘more speech’ solutions, thanks in
part to the positivity of law. First, there will be the problem of arbitrariness.
For example, if lying in politics is so serious a wrong as to call for prohibition,
what about true but seriously misleading statements that are just as damaging?
Suppose that, just before polling day, X spreads widely a claim about political
rival Y that Y has been convicted of rape, with disastrous consequences for
Y at the polls. Suppose further that, whilst true, X’s claim conveniently omit-
ted to mention that Y’s conviction many years ago was later quashed and Y
completely exonerated when someone else confessed to having committed the
crime. Should such true-but-misleading claims come within the scope of any
prohibition?50 Secondly, even a prohibition restricted to lying will require the
legislature or the courts to draw difficult distinctions, with important implica-
tions for the kinds of claims that can be made in politics.We saw above that the
issue of wrongdoing can be made to turn on whether or not a false statement
knowingly made was made ‘dishonestly’. In that regard, a legal prohibition on
disseminating political falsehoods simpliciter would require the courts to grapple
with the problem of disinformation and ‘half-truths’: content that contains an
element of truth, but which is packaged in accompanying mistruths (or vice
versa).51 A third problem likely to arise would be: is it enough that D asserts
something (statement P), knowing or believing that P is false (a lie), or should
it also be necessary to show that D intended to deceive someone through the
assertion of P (a fraud)? If it is the former view, then a legal prohibition covers
the practice of manipulating people through issuing false statements. This is a
broader phenomenon than deception, in that it covers instances in which, for
48 See C.T. Robertson et al, ‘Who Uses Fact-Checking Sites? The Impact of Demographics, Po-
litical Antecedents, and Media Use on Fact-Checking Site Awareness, Attitudes, and Behaviour’
[2020] 5 International Journal of Press Politics 217.
49 French Law no 2018-1202 on the, ‘fight against the manipulation of information,’ amending
the Freedom of Communication Act No 86-1067, September 1986. For a detailed analysis, see
R. Craufurd-Smith, ‘Fake news, French Law and democratic legitimacy: lessons for the United
Kingdom?’ (2019) 11 Journal of Media Law 52. See also Singapore’s Protection from Online
Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019, and Elections Modernization Act (Canada) 2018, s 61.
50 For a defence of the view that misleading statements should not come within the scope of polit-
ical lying offences, see R.L.Hasen, ‘A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?
(2013) 74 Montana Law Review 53, 71-72.
51 See for example K. Jones, ‘Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Hu-
man Rights Framework’ 2019 at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-11-
05-Online-Disinformation-Human-Rights.pdf.
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example, the aim of the statement is to enrage people when they realise – as they
were meant to do – that the statement was false. When it is known that legal
uncertainties of these kinds may arise, people may – as indicated above – find
themselves facing a political falsehood dilemma, and could be deterred from
making valuable but controversial political claims, to the detriment of a free
speech polity.52 Finally, the success of formal measures will depend on main-
taining what may be only a fragile trust in the capacity of independent bodies
to identify when there has been a falsehood or inaccuracy of such a nature as
to bring the preventative or prohibitive power into operation.53
The recent rise of more formal deterrent and preventative approaches may
reflect the fact that reliance on ‘more speech’ solutions to the problem of false
information in public life itself faces a number of challenges. Inequality of com-
municative power or credibility may skew the benefits of the solutions in favour
of some people, whilst leaving others behind.54 So-called ‘micro-targeting’ of
individual voters with false or distorted messages tailored to fit the voters’profile
may effectively by-pass fact-checking mechanisms.55 Perversely, a ‘more speech’
reaction may also be deliberately provoked by liars in order to raise the public
profile of the initial lie: to rebut is also to reiterate. As Hannah Arendt re-
marked, ‘[l]ies are often much more plausible, more appealing to reason, than
reality, since the liar has the great advantage of knowing beforehand what the
audience wishes or expects to hear’.56
Moreover, as Justice Brandeis indicates, in the passage cited above, a particu-
larly important problemwith the more-speech solution comes when there is (in
his words) no, ‘time to expose through discussion … falsehoods and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education.’We can call this the ‘Brandeis gap’
in the protection offered by a more-speech solution.Can the existence of such
a gap plausibly be regarded as providing one set of circumstances in which the
law – whether civil or criminal – may more justifiably intervene to deter lying,
if the harm that might otherwise be done is sufficiently significant, in spite of
the problems with formal solutions identified above? An example is where a
potentially influential lie is intentionally given publicity not long before vot-
ing commences in an election or referendum, giving no proper opportunity
to opponents of the lie-teller’s viewpoint, or to fact-checkers, to correct its ef-
fects on the victim of the falsehood. I will say more about this key example in
due course, but its importance – and the importance of the Brandeis gap,more
generally – is that when a lie is propagated in such circumstances, in threaten-
ing legal consequences we might not be so troubled by the fact that a political
falsehood dilemma (described above) is thereby raised. Putting it bluntly, if one
is relatively free to lie, distort and misrepresent for most of the course of a
52 Rowbottom, n 26 above, 513-514; 525.
53 See text at n 16 above; A. Renwick and M. Palese,Doing Democracy Better: How Can Information
and Discourse in Election and Referendum Campaigns in the UK be Improved? (London, University
College London Constitution Unit, 2019) ch 2.
54 See L. Tirell, ‘Toxic Misogyny and the Limits of Counterspeech’ (2018-19) 87 Fordham Law
Review 2433.
55 See for example M.Harker, ‘Political Advertising Revisited:Digital Campaigning and Protecting
Democratic Discourse’ (2020) 40 Legal Studies 151, 157, 171.
56 H. Arendt,Crises of the Republic (San Diego, CA:Harvest, 1972) 6.
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campaign – for so long as one’s opponents (and others) have the chance to
counter one’s claims – there might be thought to be little hardship or threat to
free speech in facing restrictions on the worst examples of such activities only
right at the end of the campaign.
Should the criminal law, though, really have a place in the maintenance of
ethical standards in politics, even in such limited circumstances? It is in fact
quite common for jurisdictions world-wide (including the UK57) to threaten
the use of criminal sanctions to deter lying in politics, where the falsehoods
are issued during election campaigns.58 In some such cases, the damage done
or threatened to the integrity of the electoral process by potentially influential
falsehoods59 has been considered to be such that criminal liability for issuing
the falsehoods is not necessarily confined to the ‘Brandeis gap’, but applies at
any point during a political campaign.60 By way of contrast, the focus of the
election-related offence may indeed be the ‘Brandeis gap’, a gap which is at its
most glaring when a false statement is made just before the close of the polls.An
example is to be found in section 81 of New Zealand’s Electoral Amendment
Act 2002:
Every person is guilty of a corrupt practice who,with the intention of influencing
the vote of any elector, at any time on polling day before the close of the poll,
or at any time on any of the 2 days immediately preceding polling day, publishes,
distributes, broadcasts, or exhibits, or causes to be published, distributed, broadcast,
or exhibited, in or in view of any public place a statement of fact that the person
knows is false in a material particular.61
By making criminalisation dependent on a false statement falling within (an
interpretation of) the ‘Brandeis gap,’ section 81 is meant to target instances in
which it may prove difficult or impossible adequately to rebut false claims in the
time available.However,Rowbottom has rightly observed that such time limits
are not only necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but perhaps over-generous, given
the instantaneous nature of claim and counter-claim in the internet age.62 It is,
perhaps, highly significant that New Zealand has not seen a single prosecution
under section 81 of the 2002 Act.63 That suggests, even if it does not prove, that
57 For a comprehensive examination, to which I am much indebted, see Rowbottom, n 26 above.
58 For discussion, see Renwick and Palese, n 53 above.
59 Rowbottom identifies three ways in which the electoral process may be compromised by lies:
the manipulation of voters in relation to their choices, the distortion of the outcome, and a more
general ’lowering of the tone’ that may disengage voters and reduce turnout:Rowbottom, n 26
above, 511-519.
60 See, for example, Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019.
61 Renwick and Palese, n 53 above, ch 2. As Jacob Rowbottom points out (n 26 above, 533), until
1999, the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority was prepared to apply its provisions on taste
and decency to political advertisements, but political advertisements are now excluded from
the Authority’s remit. The Authority’s Chair, Lord Rodgers, justified this move by saying, ‘The
free flow of argument in the cut and thrust of open debate is the best antidote to political
advertising that misleads or offends’: Advertising Standards Authority, Annual Report 1999, 2 at
https://www.asa.org.uk/asset/40D37406-BDD0-48A4-BF46C68DE81C1E39/.
62 See Rowbottom, ibid, 523-524.
63 Renwick and Palese, n 53 above, at 36.
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the criminal law – however carefully crafted – is not especially well suited to
the regulation of substantive political debate.
THE CRIME OF MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS ABOUT ELECTION
CANDIDATES
As indicated in the section above headed ‘Three statutes applicable to false
statements in campaigns’, section 106 of the 1983 Act prohibits the making of
a false statement about the personal conduct or character of a candidate, with
intent to affect a rival candidate’s electoral return:
A person who, or any director of any body or association corporate which –
(a) before or during an election,
(b) for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at the election,makes or
publishes any false statement of fact in relation to the candidate’s personal character
or conduct shall be guilty of an illegal practice, unless he can show that he had
reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, that statement to be true.
This offence is punishable upon summary conviction by a fine up to level 5 on
the standard scale. The offence has been carefully scrutinised by Rowbottom,
and I will endeavour not to replicate his analysis here.64 Nonetheless, as outlined
above, section 106 was not transposed from the election to the referendum
context in 2011 or in 2016, because there are no ‘candidates’ in referendum
campaigns.65 In so far as there is a justification for retaining the section 106
offence, I will argue that this leaves leading referendum campaigners wrongly
exposed to malicious falsehood.
In The North Division of the County of Louth,Madden J said, in construing sec-
tion 106’s predecessor,66 ‘the Act was passed for the protection of constituencies
from being misled by falsehoods of a certain kind, and is also a protection to
candidates’.67 We need to disentangle the elements in these two justifications
for what is now section 106: the elements concerned with the protection of
public goods,68 and the elements concerned with the protection of individual
rights,whether those are the rights of candidates or the rights of individual vot-
ers. Couched in such terms, there is a range of general justifications that could
64 Rowbottom, n 26 above.
65 See, by way of contrast, the equivalent Singapore provisions, n 60 above, and Wis Stat, s 12.05,
cited by Rowbottom, n 26 above, 522.
66 The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1895, s 1.
67 (1911) 6 O’M & H 103, 171.
68 On the criminal law’s role in the protection of public goods, see Horder, n 35 above. A public
good is a good the benefit of which is non-excludable and which can be shared non-rivalrously.
See further Rowbottom, n 26 above, 511 and 534. Rowbottom helpfully suggests some other
public goods protected by s 106:n 26 above,516-519, such as maintaining a high level of political
engagement amongst voters, and a respectful tone to campaigns.
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cover the prohibition on the making of false statements contrary to section
106:
(a) The prevention of attacks on, amongst other public goods, the good of
collective political decision-making shaped by adequate and accurate in-
formation;
(b) The protection of the right of electoral candidates to be free from wrongful
statements about them;
(c) The protection of electoral candidates from a potential cause of unfair
diminution of their electoral returns;
(d) The protection of the right of one or more voters not to be led to cast their
vote on the basis of false information.
(e) A combination of two or more of these justifications.
On the face of it, section 106 appears to make it clear that,at a minimum,(b) and
(c) must be proved against a defendant, through evidence that he or she made
a false statement about a candidate’s personal conduct or character in order to
affect that candidate’s electoral return. In itself, though, such a combination of
justifications ought not to be sufficient. That a lie about a candidate might be
in a broad sense defamatory (falling within (b) above) cannot on its own justify
the offence in section 106, given that one of the main reasons for abolishing
the crime of defamatory libel in 2009 was to prevent the use of the criminal
law to stifle provocative and uncompromising political speech.69 Even when
such a lie is intended to diminish a candidate’s electoral return, thus bringing
justification (c) into play, the case for criminalisation is not much enhanced.
It may be the whole point of hard-hitting speech about a candidate to deter
people from casting their vote in the candidate’s favour: that may be the very
thing that makes the speech in a broad sense ‘political’. So, justifications (b) and
(c) must in practice be combined with justifications (a) or (d), if the offence
is to be consistent with English law’s de-criminalisation policy in relation to
political speech in recent years.70
As between (a) and (d), which is the most significant? It ought to be (a).
Under section 106, the maker or publisher of the false statement must act, ‘for
the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at the election’. However,
this criterion could be satisfied by the making of a false statement intended to
influence the way a single voter casts their vote,meaning that whilst justification
(d) is satisfied, justification (a) is not. For example, to adapt the facts of the
unreported case of Miranda Grell,71 suppose D says to a fellow voter (Y) about
a particular candidate (Z), ‘You’d better not vote for that paedophile!’ If at the
time of making the statement D knew that Z was not a paedophile,but intended
the exhortation to lead Y to vote for an alternative candidate, the defendant is
guilty of the offence contrary to section 106. Justifications (b), (c) and (d) are all
69 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 73.https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/
text/90709-0013.htm.
70 See, more broadly, Council of Europe,Defamation and Freedom of Expression: Selected Documents
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2003) Part B.
71 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/7006231.stm.
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satisfied in this example, even though justification (a) is not. Reliance, without
more, on a combination of justifications (b), (c) and (d) makes the protection
offered by section 106 a protection of the individual rights of candidates and
voters. Yet, with the net cast in that fashion, the section 106 offence does not
get far beyond protecting candidates and individual voters only by keeping alive
a species of the discredited criminal libel offence, albeit a version confined to
the course of election campaigns.
By contrast, if justifications (b) and (c) were instead to be combined with
justification (a), the function of (b) and (c) could change. Instead of having a
mainly ‘permissive’ role, legitimising criminalisation, justifications (b) and (c)
might then take on a subsidiary, ‘restrictive’ role, keeping the scope of criminal-
isation based on (a) in check. In other words, they would set limits to the way in
which justification (a) – the protection of an important public good in politics
– can legitimately be pursued. Such a subsidiary role would not run counter to
the law’s de-criminalisation policy respecting defamatory statements, precisely
because that role is only restrictive in relation to a different, ‘permissive’ justifi-
cation with a different focus, such as (a). At the end of the following section a
reform of section 106 is considered that would tie it to the pursuit of permis-
sive justification (a), rather than justification (d), whilst retaining the restrictive
role of justifications (b) and (c).Why not, though, allow permissive justification
(a) to be pursued in a relatively unrestricted way, by prohibiting all knowingly
false and misleading statements that are intended to affect the election result as
a whole? Courts in some jurisdictions have taken the law some distance down
this route, through expansive statutory interpretation of provisions similar to
section 115 of the 1983 Act (considered earlier).72 We should not rule out
the possibility that the effect of a suitably limited range of false statements in
undermining (a) might be sufficient to justify criminalisation. An example –
considered briefly in the next section – might be where such statements were
intended to undermine the credibility and integrity of the election as a whole.
However, there are important arguments against a sweeping approach to coun-
tering all manner of false election or referendum statements, under the banner
of justification (a).
The concentration in section 106 only on a narrow range of instances in
which (a) is at stake – when a false statement intended to affect a candidate’s
vote return has been made or published about a candidate’s personal conduct or
character – has an ‘institutional’ purpose. It is meant to ensure that the courts
are at least able to pass judgment on the maker of the statement,without being
necessarily and consistently drawn into controversy over the merits of (party)
‘political’ claims, either about candidates or more broadly. As we saw earlier,73
judges themselves regard this as an important issue. Further, we should note
that some American courts have cast doubt on whether the importance of the
public good at stake in (a) – collective political decision-making shaped by ad-
equate and accurate information – will in itself bear the weight of justifying
72 See for example Friesen v Hammell (1997) 28 BCLR (3d) 354 (BCSC);Cameron v Becker (1995)
64 SASR 238 (South Australia SC (Full Court).
73 Text at n 16 above.
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legal restrictions on lying in campaigns generally.74 In so doing, they have con-
trasted the dubious constitutionality of such legal restrictions with what they
regard as the constitutionally more acceptable role under the First Amendment
of defamation law in protecting, ‘the property of an individual in his or her
good name’.75 That contrast resonates in this context, because section 106 is
confined to false statements about a candidate’s ‘personal’ character or conduct.
However, there have been problems with the use of this criterion as basis for
restricting the reach of section 106.
PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 106 AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DECRIMINALISATION
In practice, the courts have found it hard to draw the line between false state-
ments about a candidate’s personal conduct or character, and statements about a
candidate’s political conduct or character.76 Yet, it has been considered essential
to do so.Otherwise,with the threat of criminal proceedings hanging over cam-
paigns, ‘it would be difficult to see how the ordinary cut and thrust of political
debate could properly be carried on’.77 For that reason, the High Court has
said that ‘mixed’ statements, bearing both on a candidate’s personal and politi-
cal conduct and character, fall outside the scope of the protection provided by
section 106.78 In so saying, of course, the court thereby narrows the scope of
the protection from false claims offered by section 106 not only to candidates,
but also to voters. However, seemingly mixed statements, such as an accusation
that a candidate holds racist views,79 or an accusation of corruption in office,80
have been held to be accusations about the candidate’s personal conduct or
character. In R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court,81
an accusation that a candidate was courting extremists was found to be political
in nature,whereas an accusation that the candidate was wooing extremists who
advocate violence was said to be (ex hypothesi, wholly) personal in character.82
It is hard to resist the conclusion that, in such cases, the courts are in reality
ruling substantively on what they regard, in broad terms, as unfair campaign
74 Commonwealth v Lucas (2015) 34 NE 3rd 1242 (Mass);Rickert v Public Disclosure Commission 168
P 3d 826, 827 (Washington 2007). See the discussion in Rowbottom, n 26 above, 521-522. See
also R v Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731.
75 The State of Washington on the Relation of Public Disclosure Commission v 119 Vote No! Committee
(1998) 135 Wn 2nd 618, 629, cited by Rowbottom, ibid, 521.
76 Rowbottom, n 26 above, 526-529.
77 R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court n 16 above at [113], cited by
Rowbottom, ibid, 527.
78 R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court ibid at [111], disapproving of, in
that respect, dicta suggesting otherwise in The North Division of the County of Louth n 67 above,
163 per Gibson J.
79 Pirbhai vDPP [1995] COD 259QBD;https://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/governance/
314-governance-a-risk-articles/26861-false-statements-and-election-law.
80 The North Division of the County of Louth n 67 above.
81 R (on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court n 16 above.
82 ibid at [21], discussed by Rowbottom, n 26 above, 528.
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speech about a candidate’s fitness for office that is nonetheless tolerable, and
unfair campaign speech of this nature that is intolerable.
Let us assume, though, that amongst false election statements, a workable
distinction between the personal and the political (and the mixed) ones can
be drawn. Even so, in analysing section 106, we must also contend with the
fact that, in the Carmichael case,83 the courts abandoned any notion that section
106 is designed exclusively to provide ‘protection’ for candidates (justification
(b) above). Carmichael admitted lying during an election campaign. He con-
ceded that he had falsely denied leaking a politically sensitive Scotland Office
memo to the media. The Election Court was not persuaded beyond reason-
able doubt that the lie amounted to a statement wholly about Carmichael’s
personal conduct or character. In the Court’s view, it was better characterised
as a ‘mixed’ statement, involving Carmichael’s political as well as his personal
credibility. It would, said the Court,have been a different matter – a claim solely
about personal character and conduct – had Carmichael falsely claimed that he
was not the sort of person ever to leak a confidential memo in order to gain
a personal political advantage.84 Fair enough, so far as it goes; but in so saying,
the Court found (albeit obiter) that section 106 covers falsely positive statements
about a candidate’s personal conduct and character. Hence, the section covers
statements made by a candidate about his or her own personal conduct or char-
acter, in order to affect his or her own return. What should we make of this
development?
There are powerful reasons not to confine the scope of section 106 to nega-
tive statements. Someone might make a highly significant false statement com-
prised of both negative and positive elements, that it would be artificial to have
to separate out for legal purposes into its positive and negative aspects. For ex-
ample, in a constituency with a large number of current and former service
personnel, a candidate might seek to swing voters by saying, entirely falsely, ‘I
saw active service as a soldier, but my opponent was an army deserter.’The legal
effect of such a doubly false statement should be considered in its entirely,or not
at all. Even so, if that seems correct, then, in relation to the section 106 offence,
the restriction on the pursuit of justification (a) is no longer one necessarily tied
to a wrong done to – a damaging statement about – a candidate,even as a means
of restricting the scope of the offence. Section 106 thus covers, for example, the
kind of conduct that,when criminalised, has proved constitutionally controver-
sial in the United States: falsely claiming to be a US army veteran (so-called,
83 Petition of Timothy Denis Morrison and Others against Alistair Carmichael MP and Alistair
Buchan, in Respect of the Election for the Orkney and Shetland County UK Parliamentary
Constituency Held on 7 May [2015] ECIH 90 at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/dec/09/alistair-carmichael-lib-dem-election-court-throws-out-attempt-to-
unseat-mp. In this particular case, though, albeit with some reluctance, the Election Court
found that the defendant did not make a falsely positive statement about his own personal
character. See Rowbottom, ibid, 511.
84 ibid; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35050691. A prosecution in
this case under s 115 was also discussed: https://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/
OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5663/Heather-
Green-The-Alistair-Carmichael-Election-Petition-the-Leak-the-Lie-and-Legal-
Remedies.aspx. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this reference.
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‘stolen valour’ cases) or falsely claiming to have been endorsed by a prominent
person.85 Few theorists have argued that the harm done or threatened, when
justification (a) above is in issue, is sufficient in itself to justify criminalisation
of the making of false campaign statements, when those statements do not also
involve wrongs done to individuals. Yet, expanding the scope of section 106 to
include positive statements involves just such a move.
A re-evaluation of section 106 is required.86 To begin with, the law currently
seems caught between the pursuit of at least two goals it is hard to reconcile.On
the one hand, there is the desire to give voters, and those active in politics more
broadly, protection from the spread of false information. On the other hand,
there is the wish – when falsely negative statements are in issue – to stick by the
principle that criminal defamation has no place in politics.87 The importance of
the latter principle is underscored by the fact that it is always open to someone
to apply under section 106(3) of the 1983 Act for a court order preventing
the repetition of a false statement, a matter further considered below. Further,
a candidate can sue in private law for defamation88 (and if need be, seek to
crowdfund the action).89 Moreover, if the threat of criminal sanctions were to
be removed,someone guilty of an illegal practice,such as false statement-making
contrary to section 106, would still automatically be debarred for three years
from holding elected office, under section 160(4) of the 1983 Act.90 That is a
significant penalty, even if most people have no intention of standing for office.
By analogy, even if most people were atheists, that would not make it any less
monstrous for the state to prohibit them from practicing a religion. I suggest
that the existence of these measures to deal with a section 106 violation satisfies
the need for a proportionate response, in the case of elections.
As I just indicated, under section 106(3), there is a power to ban repetition
of (ex hypothesi) false statements – including through interlocutory proceed-
ings.91 It is strongly arguable that this power should be extended, in the case
of negative statements of a personal nature, to cover leading campaigners in
referendums.92 It does not take much imagination to see that, for example, in
a referendum on the scope of abortion, leading campaigners on either side of
the debate might well find themselves exposed to unacceptable forms of lie
about them personally. In such circumstances, campaigners are as deserving as
85 United States v Alvarez 567 US 709 (2012); Stolen Valor Act 2013;Massachusetts General Laws,
Part 1, Title VIII, ch 56, s 41A.
86 See, further, the sceptical and cautious approach of both Rowbottom, n 26 above, 525, and
Renwick and Palese, n 53 above.
87 See text at n 69 above.
88 In Oregon, electoral law gives a candidate a right to bring a private law damages suit, when
there is ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ that someone has knowingly or recklessly published
a document that, ‘contains a false statement of material fact relating to any candidate, political
committee or measure’: Election Offences (Oregon) 2019, chapter 260, 260.532.
89 See for example https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/strength-in-numbers/5066950.article.
90 Although there is a power under the 1983 Act, s 174(2) to mitigate this penalty, in a case where
someone has gone on to be convicted of the criminal offence.
91 Something rarely permitted at common law in cases where the truth of the allegation is con-
tested: see the discussion in Rowbottom, n 26 above, 508-509.
92 Someone who wished to take advantage of such a provision, as a ‘leading campaigner,’ would
be required to pre-register themselves as such with the Electoral Commission, upon proof that
they are a bona fide representative of a relevant organisation.
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election candidates of at least some enhanced protection from damaging per-
sonal attacks through false claims. What, though, about the protection of the
interests of voters (as opposed to the interests of candidates or leading cam-
paigners) from false information generally?
Whether they may have been misled by falsely negative or by falsely posi-
tive statements (or by other corrupt and illegal practices), the interests of voters
collectively are currently protected, in the case of elections at least, by the Elec-
tion Court’s powers under section 164 of the 1983 Act. Section 164 empowers
the Court to declare an election void when, amongst other things, illegal or
corrupt practices – including, but not confined to, section 106 fraud – have
so extensively prevailed that they may reasonably be supposed to have affected
the result: what can be called a ‘section 164 effect’.93 The basis for declaring
elections void for fraud is further considered in the next section, but mention
of a section 164 effect raises a final possibility canvassed earlier, bearing on re-
striction rather than abolition of section 106. If it is to be retained as an offence
in some form, one might seek to restrict the scope of section 106 to cases
in which a false statement about a candidate’s personal conduct or character
was intended to have a section 164 effect. A section 164 effect is quantitatively
more serious than that contemplated by the current low bar,of merely affecting
a candidate’s vote return; but the effect is also qualitatively different, in that it
concerns an impact on voters collectively, not as individuals. There is a plausi-
ble case for criminalisation when the intention of fraudulent statement-making
about a candidate’s personal conduct or character was to undermine the polit-
ical meaningfulness of collective voter participation in the election as a whole
(an instance of justification (a) for criminalisation, set out above94).
VOIDNESS AND VOTING: THE EFFECT OF FALSE STATEMENTS
In politics, the primary remedy for political (as opposed to personal) fraud or
corruption ought ordinarily to be a public law remedy of ‘negation’, denying
the wrongdoer the benefit of the fraud or corruption.95 There is no space to
consider here precisely how to re-shape sections 15996 and 164 of the 1983 Act,
which determine the grounds on which an election can be considered negated
– rendered void for fraud – in the light of reforms described above. However,
three points are worth making.
93 There is, by contrast, no statutory power to declare a national referendum void, even if voters
were swayed by false claims. The proper remedy lies – subject to what will be said in the next
section below – in Parliament’s power not to implement the result of the referendum.
94 See text following n 69 above. Justification (a) was the good of collective political decision-
making shaped by adequate and accurate information.
95 See J. Horder,Criminal Misconduct in Office: Law and Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2018) ch 5.9.
96 Under the 1983 Act, s 159 if a candidate him or herself is found guilty of a corrupt or illegal
practice, his or her election is automatically to be declared void.That might be considered poten-
tially disproportionate and inflexible in (say) a case in which the candidate was returned with
an overwhelming majority, but is discovered by a rival suffering from sour grapes to have made
a false statement about the personal conduct or character of the rival with a view to influencing
just one other voter (such as his or her spouse); but I will not pursue the point here.
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First, it would be right to confine such cases to instances in which someone
(including the candidate him or herself) has made a statement about a candidate
knowing or believing it to be false. Section 106(1) currently extends liability
beyond this, to include cases in which the maker of the false statement believed
it was true, but did not have reasonable grounds for that belief: liability based
on negligence. That is going too far, even when the issue is the validity of an
election rather than criminal responsibility and is not consistent with rights to
freedom of speech under Article 10.97 Secondly, in so far as section 106 provides
the grounds on which an election may be declared void, we have seen that the
current law employs an ‘inclusionary’ test for voidness: the issue is whether the
false statement was about a candidate’s personal conduct or character. It would
be possible to replace this controversial approach by employing an ‘exclusion-
ary’ test, as has been done under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate
Homicide Act 2007 to limit the scope of the duty of care owed by public au-
thorities.98 Such a test might involve considering whether the allegedly false
statement concerned a matter of (a candidate’s view on) economic, political or
social policy, in which case it would not be justiciable. For, as Schauer has re-
marked, ‘[i]nherent in the ideal of self-government is the proposition that it is
for the people alone to distinguish between truth and falsity in matters relating
to broad questions of government policy’.99 Non-excluded statements about
candidates known or believed to be false would remain justiciable.
The exclusionary approach would mean that courts would no longer be
forced to decide whether, for example, a false claim that a rival candidate had
reneged on a promise to live in the constituency was a claim exclusively about
‘personal’ conduct or character (and was hence justiciable).100 The point ought
to be that such a claim is not a claim about political, social or economic policy,
and should thus be justiciable. Such a change would bring the law more into
line with theories of free speech that place emphasis on the importance to a
flourishing public culture of treating political speech as a no-go area for official
censorship and prohibition:
[R]ights protect various spheres or domains from government intrusion on the basis
of reasons the constitution treats as impermissible reasons for government acting in
those spheres … Rights were not designed to protect individuals in their atomistic
97 See Rowbottom, n 26 above, 529-530.
98 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 3(1): ‘Any duty of care owed by a
public authority in respect of a decision as to matters of public policy (including in particular the
allocation of public resources or the weighing of competing public interests) is not a “relevant
duty of care”’.
99 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
39, cited by Rowbottom, n 26 above, 524.
100 The Election Court and the High Court have disagreed on this question. The Election Court
finding that the false claim was about personal conduct was overturned by the High Court:R
(on the application of Woolas) v The Parliamentary Election Court n 16 above at [117]. See further,
Fairbairn v Scottish National Party (1979) SC 393, in which a false allegation that an MP did not
collect his mail from the House of Commons was held to be an allegation about D’s political
conduct, and not his personal conduct.On the analysis provided here, as it was not an allegation
about political, social or economic policy it ought to have been regarded as justiciable, but quite
possibly trivial and insubstantial.
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interests in, for example self-expressiveness; rather, rights were designed to sustain
a political culture in which public liberty was enhanced by recognising certain
domains as relatively autonomous.This conception meant defining certain domains
as off limits to state action that rested on particular impermissible purposes.101
Thirdly, it is suggested that the provision for declaring an election void has
rightly not been extended to the case of non-binding national referendums. If
a non-binding national referendum is suspected or found to have been influ-
enced by fraud (as many believe, in relation to the Brexit referendum), it should
simply be given less – or no – weight, as the basis for possible reforms.102 In any
event, the sheer number of voters involved, taking their decisions on the basis
of what may be a varied range of considerations assigned differing weight,103
would set an Election Court an unacceptably political task in coming to a con-
clusion on whether or not to declare the election void. A knife-edge binding
national referendum result has been declared void (in Switzerland) in the light
of misleading figures provided by government on a key issue in the referen-
dum,104 but the circumstances in which such a process might gain traction in
the UK – if at all – cannot be considered here.105 At best, any reformed version
of section 164 of the 1983 Act should be made applicable only to binding lo-
cal referendums (when the issues liable to influence voters may be narrower in
scope), such as referendums which must be held in relation to raising the level
of council tax.106
HOW TO PROTECT CAMPAIGNERS, AND CANDIDATES
Finally, I return to the limits of the broad-ranging false statement offences con-
sidered earlier. I argued above under the heading ‘Defrauding voters and the
role of the courts’ that the prohibition in section 115 of the 1983 Act on using
a fraudulent device or contrivance to deceive voters ought to be confined to
frauds impacting on a procedural, rather than on a substantive, understanding of
liberty.That limitation is not only meant to protect freedom of political speech
in so far as it concerns opinions and viewpoints (even fabricated ones),107 but
also to protect courts from becoming embroiled in adjudication of all manner
of alleged political falsehoods in such a way as to endanger their reputation for
independence and impartiality. What, though, about the possibility that such
101 F. Shauer and R.H. Pildes, ‘Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment’ (1999) 77 Texas
Law Review 1803, 1812 and 1814.
102 For a contrary view, see E. McGaughey, ‘Could Brexit be Void?’ (2018) 29 King’s Law Journal
331.
103 See further,M.Goodwin,S.Hix,andM.Pickup, ‘For and against Brexit:A Survey Experiment of
the Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership’ (2000) 50 British




105 See further,McGaughey, n 102 above.
106 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05682.
107 See for example Shauer and Pildes, n 101 above.
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issues may arise in relation to the offences in the 1988 and 2003 Acts, discussed
in the third section, ‘Three statutes applicable to false statements in campaigns’,
above?
In considering the direction of reform of the scope of liability for online
communication of false (or grossly offensive) statements, the Law Commission
has emphasised the need for reforms in which, ‘legitimate speech that should
not be criminalised would be more clearly excluded’.108 That objective can
be achieved, whilst still permitting these offences to apply to political cam-
paign statements.109 To being with, the application of these offences to cam-
paign statements is legitimate, because the statements prohibited by the 1988
and 2003 Acts are false statements aimed at doing damage that is not essentially
reputational in nature (by way of contrast with the now abolished offence of
criminal libel). The 1988 and 2003 Acts apply only to false statements aimed
at having a negative impact on the victim’s mind: by causing (say) distress or
needless anxiety. That being so, it is arguable that, at least in serious cases, these
offences can justifiably be used to protect the interests of an election candi-
date or leading referendum campaigner. It is important not to under-estimate
the risk that some people or groups within society may be deterred from par-
ticipating in politics because of the fear of exposure to vilification and threats
when they do. For example, evidence suggests that women more frequently
make reference to the risk of being the target of public attack on their dignity
as a deterrent to entering politics.110 Such attacks may come through malicious
falsehood, as well as by other means. A thorough critique of the breadth of the
1988 and 2003 Acts is beyond the scope of this article. Such a critique would
involve asking whether, for example, in the absence of public nuisance or crim-
inal harassment, it should really be enough to justify criminalisation under the
2003 Act that a false statement was simply intended to cause ‘annoyance or
inconvenience’.111 However, putting such criticisms on one side, there is a way
to create space for protected campaign speech under the 1988 and 2003 Acts.
An amendment could indicate, first, that a relevant statement – one that
is known or believed to be false, and is intended to cause annoyance or
inconvenience (2003 Act) or distress or needless anxiety (1988 Act) – will fall
in principle outside the scope of the 1988 and 2003 Acts if it was directed at an
election candidate or (registered112) referendum campaigner during the course
of a campaign. That would do something to meet the Law Commission’s aim
of protecting free speech in principle from the application of the criminal law
in political campaign cases. Such a change would bring to the 1988 and 2003
Acts something of the policy of section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986,
which is designed to protect those who are intemperate in their language, or
108 Law Commission, n 19 above, para 13.21.
109 This is recognised by the Cabinet Office proposal (n 11 above) to make the commission of these
offences an electoral offence,opening up the range of sanctions and remedies discussed in ‘Three
statutes applicable to false statements in campaigns’ above.
110 Atalanta, [Anti]Social Media (2018), 37 at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
595411f346c3c48fe75fd39c/t/5aa6fa310d9297a484994204/1520892494037/%28Anti%
29Social_Media_Report-FINAL2-lowres.pdf ; Cabinet Office, n 12 above, para 4.1.6.
111 See Law Commission, n 19 above.
112 See n 92 above.
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simply outspoken,from victimisation by a criminal law in thrall to over-sensitive
people:
Nothing in this Part [hate offences] shall be read or given effect in a way which
prohibits or restricts discussion,criticism or expressions of antipathy,dislike, ridicule,
insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or
of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising
or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their
religion or belief system.
However, secondly, there should be an exception, where the 1988 and 2003
Acts should apply, if a relevant statement was directed at an election candidate
or referendum campaigner, and:
i. The statement was intended to have a serious effect on the victim’s state of mind,
and
ii. there was no opportunity adequately to counter the effect of the statement.
The point of (ii) is to accommodate the Brandeis gap, discussed above.113 The
point of (i) is to link the criminality of making a false statement with a threat to
‘negative’ political freedom, the freedom from obstacles to doing as one wishes
(including certain internal obstacles, such as fear).114 Criminalisation is justi-
fied when a false statement threatens, through the effect it is meant to have
on V’s mind, to undermine V’s effective participation in the campaign. Some
defamatory statements might have such an effect but would only stand to be
criminalised because they were intended to have such an effect (and not be-
cause they were defamatory). An example might be a false claim that a can-
didate or campaigner was a child sex offender.115 However, a case could fall
within the proposed amendment without the false statement being defamatory.
An example might be a false but credible statement, sent at a crucial point in
the campaign, suggesting that a candidate or campaigner’s only child has been
killed in an accident (in circumstances, perhaps,where the truth was difficult to
ascertain).The recent proposal from the Committee on Standards in Public Life
for an offence of intimidating parliamentary candidates or campaigners follows
113 See ‘The ‘more speech’ solution and its limits’ above. It would probably be right to provide
that the defendant should bear the evidential burden, in relation to (ii). Prosecution guidance
should indicate that a prosecution should not be undertaken when the absence of an adequate
opportunity to counter the effect of the statement came from a spreading of the statement
through the public domain that D could not reasonably have foreseen as the effect of his or her
conduct.
114 See the discussion in G. Crowder, ‘Negative and Positive Liberty’ (1988) 40 Political Science 57.
It is important to note that negative liberty is not the same concept as the procedural kind of
liberty discussed in the second section above. The latter cuts across the negative-positive liberty
distinction by incorporating some elements, such as robust voting procedures, from the domain
of positive liberty.
115 See the Miranda Grell case, n 71 above.
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this general line of argument.116 Intimidation is defined by the Committee as
words or behaviour intended or likely to block or deter participation, which
could reasonably lead to an individual wanting to withdraw from public life.117
The point is that criminalisation is not justified simply because, for example, a
false statement is intended to make V needlessly anxious about whether or not
the merits of his or her candidacy or arguments will be accurately understood
by voters.To target such cases would involve the criminal law in protecting sub-
stantive political freedom, an inappropriate task (I argued in the second section
above) for which it is ill-suited.
CONCLUSION
Political theorists divide sharply on whether coercive steps – or any legal steps
at all – should be taken to deter lying in politics, whether or not the lies are
told during campaign periods.118 I have been concerned only with the existing
criminal law, as it applies to false statements made in election and referendum
campaigns. Although I have not defended the point in detail, it seems obvious
that it may be necessary and proportionate to use the criminal law to prohibit
the making of false statements about elections procedures. Without such pro-
hibitions, the state may simply be unable to guarantee the observance of basic
electoral principles, such as one person,one vote.By contrast,other than in cases
tantamount to intimidation, I have been sceptical about the value of employing
the criminal law to deter lying about substantive (as opposed to procedural)
political matters – viewpoint politics – including lies about the personal repu-
tations of election candidates and referendum campaigners.119
Even so, other avenues down which criminalisation of election or
referendum-related speech might legitimately be pursued do exist. I have fo-
cused on what one might call the ‘content-based’ problem of falsehood.How-
ever, the explosion of internet-based politicking world-wide has given rise to
a ‘source-based’ problem about falsehoods (and about unacceptable forms of
speech generally). This problem is the ease with which messages likely to gain
wide influence through on-line communication can be faked to look as if they
come from a particular source.120 It would be worth exploring the extent to
116 Committee on Standards in Public Life, n 45 above; Cabinet Office, n 11 above, ch 4.
117 ibid, 26.
118 See, generally, J.Meibauer (ed),The Oxford Handbook of Lying (Oxford: OUP, 2019) ch 41.
119 Although we have seen that criminalisation may possibly be justified when the intention in
making a false statement of a personal nature about an election candidate was to threaten the
integrity of the election as a whole.
120 See for example J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, and J. Herrera, Information
Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies (Paris: Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) Ministry for
Europe and Foreign Affairs, and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) Ministry for the
Armed Forces, 2018) Part 2, II.
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which, just as political parties face criminal liability if they fail properly to re-
veal the source of their donations,121 they should face such liability if they fail
to reveal (or falsely represent) the true source of political statements the making
of which they have assisted or encouraged during campaigns.122
121 See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
122 Facebook now requires sources to be disclosed in relation to advertisements, ‘made by, on be-
half of, or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party or [where
the advertisement] advocates for the outcome of an election to public office; or about any
election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including “go out and vote” or election campaigns’:
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506?id=288762101909005.
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